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THE CURSE OF EXTREMES: GENERALIST CAREER EXPERIENCE 
AND CEO INITIAL COMPENSATION 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Studies argue that generalist CEOs are more valued by the market for executive labor and 
receive higher initial compensation. Challenging this prevailing assumption, we acknowledge 
the drawbacks of extensive career mobility and predict an inverted U-shape relationship 
between CEO generalist career experience and CEO initial compensation. Integrating the 
generalism and specialization views of human capital, we postulate that at an initial level, the 
acquisition of experience-breadth from different firms and industries enables CEOs to broaden 
their knowledge-base, obtain a variety of skills, and thus increase their labor-market value and 
initial compensation. After a threshold, however, the accumulation of extensive levels of career 
generalism through frequent job-hopping across firm and industry contexts gradually causes a 
lack of experience-depth and insufficient career specialization – thereby triggering lower CEO 
market-value and initial pay. Data from 197 CEO appointments in large publicly traded firms 
support our predictions. Our results also show that the observed inverted U-shape relationship 
varies with factors nested at different layers of context – highlighting the contingent nature of 
this area of research.  
 
Keywords: CEO career experience; CEO compensation; Human capital; Curvilinearity; 
Executive job demands 
  
Generalist Career Experience and CEO Initial Compensation 
- 3 - 
INTRODUCTION 
The increase in CEO compensation has sparked an intense debate about the determinants 
of this trend (Devers, Cannella, Reilly & Yoder, 2007; van Essen, Heugens, Otten, & van 
Oosterhout, 2012; van Essen, Otten & Carberry, 2015). Indeed, scholars have recognized that 
“few topics on strategic leadership generate the same degree of controversy” as the antecedents 
of CEO pay (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009: 291). In understanding the determinants 
of CEO compensation, researchers have focused on CEO human capital and career backgrounds 
(Falato, Li & Milbourn, 2015; Murphy & Zabojnik, 2004), arguing that corporate leaders with 
broad-general career experience receive different compensation packages at the time of 
appointment compared to their narrow-specialist counterparts (Custodio, Ferreira, & Matos, 
2013; Frydman, 2019; Merluzzi & Phillips, 2016). Examining the human capital antecedents 
of CEO initial pay is important, as it helps us to understand the skills that firms value most 
when they select corporate leaders (Chen, 2015; Fulmer, 2009; Graffin, Hubbard, Christensen, 
& Lee, 2020). Yet, while research in this area has gained momentum, the degree to which 
generalist versus specialist human capital results in higher CEO initial pay is not clearly 
established in the literature.  
On the one hand, some studies take the generalism view to argue that the accumulation 
of experience-breadth from different firm and industry contexts enhances a CEO’s information 
processing ability (Dragoni, Oh, Vankatwyk, & Tesluk, 2011), and promotes increasing CEO 
market value and initial compensation (Custodio et al., 2013; Frydman, 2019). Conversely, 
however, another research stream draws on the specialization view to highlight the 
disadvantages of accumulating diverse career experience (Kang & Snell, 2009). According to 
this perspective, career mobility across firm and industry contexts comes at the expense of 
sacrificing career specialization (Mishra, 2014) – often resulting in superficial knowledge from 
a variety of areas without mastery in any of them (Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, & Rittmann, 
2003). Individuals who engage in high career mobility are therefore more likely to face the 
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“paradox of breadth” (Kacperczyk & Younkin, 2017: 731), signal insufficient career focus to 
potential employers, and realize lower economic returns (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999; Simmons 
& Berri, 2009). Such theoretical and empirical controversy calls for a more detailed 
conceptualization over whether, and under what conditions, broad-general as opposed to 
narrow-specialized career backgrounds associate with higher (or lower) CEO market value and 
initial compensation.  
In this study, we add to this area of research. Integrating the seemingly opposing 
arguments of the generalism and specialization views, we postulate that the relationship 
between CEO generalist career experience and CEO initial compensation is neither positive nor 
negative per se, but rather inverted curvilinear. Initially, the accumulation of experience breadth 
from various firms and industries enables CEOs to broaden their knowledge-base (Karaevli & 
Hall, 2006), enhance their information processing ability (Custodio, Ferreira, & Matos, 2019), 
and thereby realize the market value and initial pay advantages underscored by the generalism 
view. After a threshold, however, the accumulation of extensive levels of varied career 
experience comes with a relative loss of specialization, gradually causing a lack of experience 
depth. This lack of specialization that occurs toward excessive levels of generalist experience 
will – ceteris paribus – lead to lower CEO market value and initial compensation.  
Further, taking a contingency perspective on the value of CEO human capital (Combs & 
Skill, 2003) and drawing on the notion of ‘context-induced’ executive job demands (Chen, 
2015; Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996), we also 
suggest that the proposed inverted U-shape relationship varies with a set of contingencies – the 
firm’s degree of diversification (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996), the organization’s prior 
performance (Chen, 2015), and the level of industry complexity (Datta, Guthrie, & 
Rajagopalan, 2002). Scholars have argued that these factors relate to the ‘complexity-driven’ 
and ‘performance-driven’ executive job demands (Hambrick et al., 2005) and affect how CEOs 
are compensated (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). Extending this line of reasoning, we 
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examine how CEOs with different career profiles are more (or less) likely to realize higher 
initial pay returns when they are appointed by firms facing different conditions. Given that 
diverse experience is valued more in contexts with high information processing requirements 
(Hambrick et al., 2005) – we suggest that generalist CEOs will be more likely to bid up their 
price, and receive higher initial pay, when they are appointed in such contexts. In this regard, 
we respond to the call for more integrative studies on CEOs (Busenbark, Krause, Boivie & 
Graffin, 2016) – by proposing a framework that simultaneously incorporates the person (CEO 
human capital) and the environment (firm diversification, past performance, and industry 
complexity) to explain the complex link between CEO career background and initial CEO pay.  
It is useful to make two clarifications about our focus and analyses on CEO compensation. 
First, we focus on initial pay (i.e., the pay a CEO receives in the first complete fiscal year of 
appointment) to reduce the effects of managerial power accumulated over a CEO’s tenure, 
which may mask the effects of human capital credentials on CEO compensation (see also: Chen, 
2015; Falato et al., 2015; Graffin et al., 2020). Second, acknowledging that CEO selection 
preferences and recruitment processes vary among organizations and between contexts (Datta 
et al., 2002; Phillips & Gully, 2015), we account for various confounding factors that may 
concurrently influence CEO selection and CEO initial pay.  
Our study makes three key contributions to the literature on CEO initial compensation 
and human capital. First, it challenges prevailing assumptions about the value of CEO 
generalist versus specialist career experience. We demonstrate that – ceteris paribus – 
‘penalties in human-capital value’ are likely to occur not only for newly appointed CEOs who 
have excessively specialized throughout their careers and thus lack generic skills (Custodio et 
al., 2013; Merluzzi & Philipps, 2016; Murphy & Zabojnik, 2004), but also for those who have 
excessively diversified their human capital by engaging in frequent career mobility across firms 
and industries. In this regard, our study offers insights that are relevant not only for executives 
who make career choices with the aim of optimizing their labor market value (Datta et al., 
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2002), but also for firms that establish programs for selecting and developing top managers 
with valuable human capital. 
Second, our study advances research on the effects of context-driven job demands on 
CEO initial compensation (Hambrick et al., 2005). Research shows that CEOs appointed by 
firms facing greater informational demands are paid higher at the time of selection – as a 
premium for the managerial challenges they are expected to face after appointment (Chen, 
2015; Combs & Skill, 2003). Our work adds to this area of research by revealing that the ceteris 
paribus declining pay effects toward high levels of generalism vary under conditions of 
different job demands (Hambrick et al., 2005; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). Overall, our 
study challenges the prevailing ‘the more generalist the better’ logic. It reveals that there may 
be a ‘curse of extremes’, whereby extensively high and extensively low levels of CEO 
generalism promote lower initial pay (relative to moderate levels) across a range of conditions.  
Finally, our work offers practical implications regarding the notion of boundaryless career 
orientation – which has often been described as an ideal path for executives to increase their 
labor market value (Mansaramani, 2012). Our work confirms that there is, indeed, a ‘dark side 
of contemporary careers’ (Baruch & Vardi, 2016: 355), whereby executives who engage in 
excessive career mobility realize lower initial compensation. To this end, our work has practical 
implications for executive career development.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Strategic leadership research has long been concerned with understanding the factors 
that drive firms to select and compensate executives based on their skills and career experiences 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). A key trend in this field of research is the shift from the ‘traditional’ 
organizational career path, to the rise of ‘protean and boundaryless’ careers (Briscoe, Hall, & 
DeMuth, 2006: 30). Empirical evidence shows that, compared to some decades before, CEOs 
today have spent on average less time in their current firms and often possess experience from 
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a variety of institutional contexts (Murphy & Zabojnik, 2004). From a strategic staffing 
perspective, the observed lower average of CEO tenure implies that firms tend to more 
frequently select corporate leaders with generalist human capital (Custodio, Ferreira, & Matos, 
2019). Meanwhile, scholars stress that there are still factors that motivate executives to follow 
traditional career paths (Baruch & Vardi, 2016) and develop specialized career profiles. 
At the time of CEO selection, firms compete for executive talent, and attempt to recruit 
individuals with an abundance of human capital. Given its complex nature, however, the 
selection of a new CEO is affected by several aspects – including whether the firm can attract 
a wide pool of candidates and select the optimal one (Phillips & Gully, 2015). Beyond why 
firms select one CEO over another candidate, however, a number of studies have examined 
CEO initial compensation after appointment – by observing pay differences between CEOs 
selected by firms that face different conditions (Bragaw & Misangyi, 2017; Chen, 2015; Falato 
et al., 2015). While studies on CEO selection help to explain why the firm appointed a CEO 
vis-à-vis another candidate, studies on CEO initial compensation reveal ‘how much’ a CEO’s 
human capital is valued across different contexts. According to Merluzzi and Phillips (2016: 
97), initial pay provides a direct economic determinant of the amount that an “employer is 
willing to pay in order to obtain the employee” – and thus can provide insights on how CEOs 
with different career backgrounds are valued by firms facing different conditions. 
In examining the relationship between career experience and initial pay, scholars have 
distinguished between two types of career-investments: (a) investments in acquiring 
experience-breadth and generic skills (i.e., career generalism) and (b) investments in 
developing experience-depth (i.e., career specialization) (Ferguson & Hasan, 2013). In 
particular, some studies have examined how inter-firm and inter-industry mobility helps 
individuals to broaden their knowledge repertoires, acquire a variety of skills from different 
contexts, and hence increase their overall labor-market value and compensation (Custodio et 
al., 2013). Yet, other studies have underscored the importance of career specialization – 
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acknowledging that specialized-knowledge is a ‘net benefit’ that associates with higher 
remuneration returns (Ferguson & Hasan, 2013; Munasinghe & Sigman, 2004). This theoretical 
controversy has led to calls for investigating the trade-off between generalism and 
specialization in executive careers (Falato et al., 2015; Frydman, 2019; Lazear, 2004; Sullivan 
& Baruch, 2009).  
In this study we contribute to this area of research. We postulate that the notions of 
generalism and specialization should be considered in parallel – as they jointly explain the 
economic value of a CEO’s career background. On the one hand, executives with extensive 
levels of specialization possess experience that is limited within a given domain of expertise, 
and thus lack the variety of skills that is essential for the effective management of large and 
complex organizations (Custodio et al., 2013; Murphy & Zabojnik, 2004). Conversely, 
executives with extensive levels of generalism often signal insufficient career-focus and 
expertise to potential employers (Zuckerman et al, 2003). While generalism equips executives 
with varied human capital and generic skills (Custodio et al., 2013), extensive career mobility 
demonstrates a lack of career focus (Kacperczyk & Younkin, 2017) and is subject to the 
negative effects of continuous ‘job hopping’ across employers and contexts (Munasinghe & 
Sigman, 2004). Reconciling these seemingly opposing streams of thought, we contend that 
generalism and specialization represent a trade-off – where CEOs at relatively moderate levels 
of the generalist experience continuum (i.e., those who attain a relative balance of generalism 
and specialization) realize higher initial pay returns compared to those at the extremes (i.e., 
extensive generalists and extensive specialists). Our logic therefore implies that the acquisition 
of generalist career experience is only beneficial for a CEO’s value up to a threshold – after 
which the specialization costs of excessive career mobility start to become dominant and 
outweigh the benefits of additional generalism, gradually lowering new CEO value and initial 
compensation.  
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Further, drawing on the literature of executive job demands (Hambrick et al., 2005; 
Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996), we assess how CEOs with different career profiles are more 
(or less) likely to bid-up their price and receive higher initial pay when hired by firms facing 
different conditions. Given that CEOs with broad general career experience are – ceteris paribus 
– considered as more valuable in contexts of high informational requirements (Datta et al., 
2002), we suggest that the disadvantageous effects toward extensive levels of generalist 
experience will become less pronounced in such contexts. Our contingency approach therefore 
allows us to observe how the relative economic value realized by CEOs with different career 
backgrounds at the time of appointment varies across different conditions.  
 
CEO Career Experience and Initial Compensation: A Generalism View  
Research subscribing to the generalism view of human capital suggests that the 
accumulation of broad-general career experience triggers higher CEO value and initial pay, for 
the following reasons. First, experience from various firms and industries enables CEOs to 
enhance their information processing abilities (DeFillippi & Arthur, 1994). According to 
Dragoni et al. (2011), the accumulation of broad-general managerial skills pertains to holistic 
diagnoses of business problems. Indeed, Hitt and Tyler (1991) provided evidence that 
executives with broad-general career experience are inclined to use more criteria to assess 
strategic situations, and thereby make novel strategic decisions. Their higher information 
processing ability, as well as their diverse networks and information from a variety of domains 
(Kleinbaum, 2012), help generalist CEOs to effectively respond to the various informational 
demands facing large and complex organizations (Karaevli & Hall, 2006). Such anticipated 
benefits increase a CEO’s market value (Custodio et al., 2013), and ultimately result in higher 
initial compensation. 
Second, the accumulation of broad-general career experience from different firm- and 
industry-settings increases a CEO’s bargaining power in the labor market, as it widens the pool 
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of employers in which the CEO’s skills are considered as transferable and valuable (Frydman 
& Saks, 2010; Frydman, 2019). Compared to executives with highly specialized experience 
from a single firm and industry environment, generalists possess knowledge and skills that are 
relevant for a wider pool of organizations at the time of selection (Frydman & Jenter, 2010). 
This makes them attractive to a wider range of potential employers (Frydman & Saks, 2010), 
which in turn increases their bargaining power in the labor market, as well as their ability to 
bid-up their price at the time of appointment (Chen, 2015; Falato et al., 2015). 
Third, research has shown that career generalism and varied experience allows CEOs to 
strategically conceptualize across rapidly changing situational contexts (Dane, 2010). The 
acquisition of experience from different firms and industries helps managers to become fast and 
adaptive learners who can utilize diverse know-how across a variety of conditions (Karaevli & 
Hall, 2006: 359). In Norburn’s (1989) study, for example, “the CEOs’ exposures to a wider 
variety of situations were seen as particularly critical […] for complex multi-dimensional 
decision making” (Karaevli & Hall, 2006: 364). The cognitive flexibility and knowledge-
transfer ability ensure that generalist CEOs’ human capital is perceived as valuable at the time 
of recruitment (Falato et al., 2015), and thereby prompts higher initial pay. 
 
CEO Career Experience and Initial Compensation: A Specialization View  
Whereas the generalist view highlights the labor market and economic advantages of 
acquiring broad-general career experience, another stream of research underscores the benefits 
of career specialization for CEOs. First, in contrast with generalists, specialist CEOs possess 
in-depth and expert-based knowledge (Datta et al., 2002). Such specialized experience is 
“localized, embedded, and invested within particular knowledge domains” (Kang & Snell, 
2009: 68). This enables specialist CEOs to develop a deep understanding of their areas of 
expertise, and to demonstrate career-focus to potential employer firms (Collins, 2001). 
Conversely, generalist CEOs often “suffer from the ‘jack of all trades but master of none’ 
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syndrome” (Buyl, Boone, Hendriks, & Matthyssens, 2011: 170), as their extensive career 
mobility often produces insufficient career focus and a relative lack of expertise. Also, 
experience from many areas and environments can trigger a cognitive information overload, 
preventing the development of specialized knowledge and experience depth (Dane, 2010). 
From this point of view, specialist CEOs may be considered as more valuable at the time of 
selection (Smith & White, 1987) – and may thereby be offered a more generous initial 
compensation package that reflects their expertise-based credentials (Baruch & Vardi, 2016; 
Mishra, 2014; Simmons & Berri, 2009). 
Second, scholars have stressed that individuals who gain specialized career experience 
signal human capital identity to potential employers (Salas, Rosen, & DiazGranados, 2010). 
According to the stayer-mover model (Judge & Watanabe, 1995), individuals who have shown 
more commitment to their current or previous employer companies (i.e., stayers) signify that 
they are likely to be committed to the hiring firm after their appointment – compared to frequent 
movers. This increases the labor-market value of individuals with specialized backgrounds, as 
it signals low risk-of-hiring at the time of recruitment (Munasinghe & Sigman, 2004). Such 
signals may enhance a CEO’s value (Astebro & Thompson, 2011), resulting in higher initial 
compensation. 
Third, studies have shown that specialization and expertise enable executives to 
effectively deal with decision making complexity (Simmons & Berri, 2009). Through repeated 
observation, specialization facilitates the acquisition and recombination of experience (Smith 
& White, 1987). Specialist CEOs possess greater “causal depth of knowledge” (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982: 76) which “allows them to see through complexity” recognize what is essential, 
and ignore the rest at the time of strategic decision-making (Collins, 2001: 91). From a 
specialization view, high levels of career focus therefore equip CEOs with knowledge depth 
and enables them to increase their market value and initial pay. 
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CEO Generalism and Specialization: An Integrative View 
As described above, there are two opposing theoretical streams in the extant literature: 
(a) the one that adopts a generalism view to highlight the career-related and economic 
advantages of acquiring breadth of career experience, and (b) another that takes a 
specialization-view to underscore the disadvantages that occur from high levels of ‘job hopping’ 
and career mobility. While these streams are typically considered contradictory, we argue that 
their positions are not mutually exclusive. Our theoretical framework implies that the notions 
of generalism and specialization jointly represent the following trade-off: a gain in generalism 
and experience-breadth can only occur at the expense of sacrificing a respective degree of 
career specialization (Ferguson & Hasan, 2013). By engaging in career mobility, individuals 
therefore invest in acquiring breadth of experience from different institutional settings while at 
the same time sacrificing a relative degree of career focus and specialization (Kim, 1989). 
Following this premise, we postulate that the relationship between CEO generalist 
experience and initial compensation is neither positive-linear (as the generalism view suggests) 
nor negative-linear (as the specialization view suggests) – but rather inverted-curvilinear. 
Initially, as individuals move from low to moderate levels on the CEO generalist experience 
continuum, they acquire experience from different firms and industries, enrich their knowledge 
repertoires by building a required level of varied skills, and thus, gradually improve their 
market-value and initial compensation (Custodio et al., 2013). However, after reaching a 
threshold level of career mobility, the costs of sacrificing specialization start to outweigh the 
benefits of accumulating additional generalism – gradually resulting in a relative lack of 
knowledge-depth and expertise. The lower ability to signal expertise to potential employers at 
high levels of career generalism will give more gravitation to the arguments of the 
specialization-view – gradually promoting reduced CEO value and lower initial pay.  
Thus, we suggest that an optimum at moderate levels of the CEO generalist-experience 
continuum exists. At this optimum, CEOs have accumulated breadth of experience from 
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different contexts up to a level that allows them to retain and signal career specialization. The 
relative balance of breadth (generalism) and depth (specialization) dimensions equip CEOs with 
the required variety of skills (Dragoni et al., 2011), while at the same time enabling them to 
also demonstrate career focus and expertise to potential employers. The optimal balance of 
breadth and depth in a CEO’s career profile will thus result in higher CEO market value and 
initial compensation.  
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverted U-shape relationship between new CEO 
generalist experience and initial compensation. 
 
Organizational and Environmental Contingencies 
CEOs differ from each other with regard to their job demands (Hambrick et al., 2005)– 
and these demands impact their initial compensation (Chen, 2005; Henderson & Fredrickson, 
1996). In their conceptual study, Hambrick et al. (2005) argued that there are two distinct forms 
of context-induced executive job demands – complexity challenges and performance 
challenges. While complexity challenges emanate from the multiplicity of the strategic and 
environmental context of the firm (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996), performance challenges 
occur under conditions of low prior firm performance (Chen, 2015). Following this premise, 
our contingency framework implies that the hypothesized inverted U-shape relationship may 
vary with the following three factors, nested at the firm and industry levels: (a) the firm’s degree 
of diversification, (b) the prior performance of the firm (i.e., whether the firm has experienced 
a prior performance decline), and (c) the industry-level complexity. While industry complexity 
and firm diversification allow us to capture the complexity challenges facing the firm in its 
internal and external context (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996), the consideration of prior 
performance decline enables us to observe what Hambrick et al., (2005) defined as the 
performance challenges facing new CEOs – which may impact their initial compensation 
(Chen, 2015). 
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Our contingency approach acknowledges that variation in CEO selection preferences 
exist not only between firms facing different conditions, but also among firms operating in 
similar contexts (Fulmer, 2009). Indeed, such variations in CEO selection preferences is an 
additional reason why the notions of generalism versus specialization should be considered as 
a continuum – rather than as two separate constructs. For example, while highly diversified 
firms are – ceteris paribus – inclined to emphasize generalist human capital in CEO selection 
due to their diverse strategic demands (Datta et al., 2002), some of these firms may seek to hire 
CEOs who possess more specialized experience from within the diverse context of the firm. 
However, as differences in terms of the value of generalist versus specialist experience are 
expected to be larger between firms in different contexts, than between firms within similar 
contexts (Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001; Datta et al., 2002; Merluzzi & Phillips, 2016), 
we expect that the relative pay of CEOs at different levels of the generalist experience 
continuum will vary across different conditions. By taking a contingency view (Carpenter et 
al., 2001; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996), our approach allows us to observe the relative 
rewarded-value of new CEOs with different human capital when hired by firms facing different 
conditions (Carpenter et al., 2001; Chen, 2015; Geletkanycz et al., 2001). 
 
Firm Diversification. Firm diversification profoundly determines the informational demands 
facing CEOs in their jobs (Hambrick et al., 2005), and is therefore likely to influence CEO 
initial compensation (Harris & Helfat, 1997; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). In this study, 
we postulate that under conditions of high firm diversification, the downward slope of the 
inverted U-shape relationship will flatten (i.e., will become less steep) for the following reasons. 
First, CEO generalist experience has often been described as a remedy to the various 
informational demands facing diversified organizations (Smith & White, 1987). Informational 
requirements rise when intra-firm interdependencies “become more complex, [and] 
coordination and mutual problem solving demands increase” (Tushman & Nadler, 1978: 616). 
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As generalist managers possess diverse knowledge from various firm and industry 
environments, their career experience will be perceived as a relatively more valuable resource 
to deal with the diverse informational requirements facing large diversified corporations (Datta 
et al., 2002; Smith & White, 1987). This will provide generalist CEOs with a greater 
opportunity to bid-up the price of their varied human capital at the time of selection (Carpenter 
et al., 2001). Under these conditions, the declining initial compensation returns at high levels 
of the CEO generalism continuum are therefore expected to attenuate. 
Second, in highly diversified firms, CEOs need to implement coordination processes in 
the executive group that facilitate the establishment of effective synergies accross diverse 
business domains (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). Studies have shown that generalist CEOs 
act as effective integrators of the executive group (Buyl et al., 2011; Georgakakis, Greve, & 
Ruigrok, 2017), and possess the required variety skills to develop effective synergies among 
the various units of diversified organizations (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). As generalist 
managers can act as effective integrators (Karaevli & Hall, 2006), large diversified firms are 
expected to assign a relatively higher importance to their diversified career backgrounds at the 
time of selection – and compensate them with higher initial pay. Thus, we expect that the 
downward slope at high levels of the generalist experience continuum will become less 
pronounced (i.e., will flatten) under conditions of high firm diversification.  
Hypothesis 2: Under conditions of high firm diversification, the downward slope 
of the inverted U-shape relationship between new CEO generalist experience and 
initial compensation will flatten (i.e., will become less pronounced). 
 
Prior performance decline. According to Hambrick et al. (2005), executive job demands are 
not only determined by the complexity challenges that characterize the firm’s internal and 
external environment, but also by the performance challenges surrounding the organization. At 
the time of CEO selection, firms that have experienced a major performance decline in 
preceding years face greater difficulties in attracting and recruiting executive talent (Child, 
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1974). Compared to well-performing organizations, poorly performing firms are therefore more 
likely to pay an extra premium for attracting and appointing CEOs with valuable human capital 
(Chen, 2015). Along these lines, we argue that under conditions of declining prior firm 
performance, the downward slope of the inverted U-shape relationship will become less 
pronounced.  
 First, given the tendency to associate CEO generalist experience with the transfer of 
new and diverse knowledge, poorly performing firms are expected to consider generalist human 
capital as a remedy to their demands for renewal and change (Karaevli & Hall, 2006). Indeed, 
recent research shows that in situations where innovation and change are essential, such as 
under conditions of declining prior firm performance, the possession of varied experience 
allows managers to effectively respond to organizational demands (Crossland, Jinyong, Hiller, 
& Hambrick, 2014). By drawing on their diverse knowledge and human capital, generalist 
CEOs can innovate (Custodio et al., 2019), shake things up, and effectively alter the firm’s 
performance status quo. Such anticipated benefits regarding the value of generalism under 
conditions that require innovation and change (i.e. declining prior performance) (Chen, 2015; 
Frydman, 2019) will reduce the lower-initial-pay effects at high levels of the generalist 
experience continuum. 
Second, under conditions of high job demands due to declining prior firm performance, 
a CEO with experience from a variety of contexts will have a greater negotiating power – 
compared to an extensive specialist CEO with more contextually-limited knowledge (often 
from within the poorly performing firm) (Custodio et al., 2013). Since generalist CEOs have 
more context-transferable skills and employment options (Frydman, 2019), they are expected 
to be in a relatively stronger position to negotiate a higher pay premium at the time of selection 
in order to take the leadership of a poorly-performing organization (Chen, 2015). Thus, given 
the overall tendency to associate generalist experience with innovation and change (Crossland 
et al., 2014; Custodio et al., 2019), as well as the greater ability of generalist CEOs to bid-up 
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their price in contexts of prior firm performance decline (Chen, 2015), we expect that the 
downward slope of the inverted U-shape relationship will become less pronounced (i.e., will 
flatten) under such conditions.   
Hypothesis 3: Under conditions of high prior firm performance decline, the 
downward slope of the inverted U-shape relationship between new CEO generalist 
experience and initial compensation will flatten (i.e., will become less pronounced). 
 
Industry Complexity. Scholars have argued that the industry environment of the firm reflects 
executive job demands (Hambrick et al., 2005), and influences CEO initial compensation 
(Chen, 2015; Datta et al., 2002). A key industry-level factor related to CEO job demands is 
whether the firm operates in a more complex industry context where the market share is equally 
spread among a large number of competitors – vis-à-vis an oligopolistic (highly concentrated) 
industry context (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). Indeed, studies have shown that firms operating 
under conditions of high industry complexity (low industry concentration) experience higher 
demands for information processing and strategic renewal – as they strive to continuously 
respond to the moves and actions of various emerging competitors (Hambrick et al., 2005). To 
effectively respond to such industry-level competitive demands, firms in complex industries 
are likely to exhibit a stronger preference for recruiting and selecting generalist CEOs, who can 
promote strategic novelty by drawing on their broad-general career experience (Datta et al., 
2002). 
Accordingly, we argue that under conditions of high industry complexity, the downward 
slope of the inverted U-shape relationship will become less pronounced, for the following 
reasons. First, highly complex (non-concentrated) industries are characterized by lower barriers 
to entry (Dess & Beard, 1984). Organizations that operate in such industries require CEOs who 
can develop flexible strategies that enable the firm “to fend off attacks and retaliations from 
varied competitors” (Nadkarni, Chen, & Chen, 2016: 1143). Given that career generalism 
relates to the establishment of flexible strategic mindsets (Dane, 2010) and to a higher 
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information processing ability (Dragoni et al., 2011), CEO with high levels of generalist 
experience will be seen as a remedy to the diverse competitive demands of the industry. This 
provides CEOs at high levels of generalism with greater opportunities to negotiate a higher 
price for their diverse experience at the time of recruitment. Under such conditions, the negative 
effects of high levels of CEO generalism on initial compensation will therefore be attenuated – 
resulting in a less steep downward slope of the inverted U-shape relationship.  
Second, industry complexity reflects a firm’s need to frequently promote strategic 
renewal (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). On the one hand, firms in non-complex, oligopolistic 
industries are characterized by higher levels of competitive interdependence. Hence, they need 
specialist CEOs who can develop strategies that match with the industry’s pre-established 
norms and standards (Tang, Li, & Yang, 2015). Conversely, organizations in highly complex 
industries require executives who can frequently alter the firm’s strategic status quo – and 
realign the organization with the frequently shifting competitive demands of the external 
context (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). As generalist CEOs with diverse experience exhibit a 
tendency toward experimentation and change (Crossland et al., 2014), and as industry 
complexity poses higher demands for strategic adaptation (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999), we 
expect that high levels of career generalism will be perceived as a relatively more valuable 
resource in complex industry contexts. While some firms in concentrated (less complex) 
industries may decide to hire generalist CEOs with the aim to spur innovation (Custodio et al., 
2019), the general need of firms in complex industries to deal with diverse informational 
requirements will drive them to place greater emphasis on diverse career experience at the time 
of CEO selection. This provides generalist CEOs with better opportunities to bid-up the price 
of their diverse human capital – and thus to realize higher initial pay. 
Hypothesis 4: Under conditions of high industry complexity, the downward slope 
of the inverted U-shape relationship between new CEO generalist experience and 
initial compensation will flatten (i.e., will become less pronounced). 
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METHODS 
Sample and data 
Our data comprises CEO appointments at a sample of large stock-listed firms based in 
four countries (i.e. Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK) over a seven years 
between 2007 and 2013. Firms listed in the stock exchanges of the selected countries comply 
with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer & 
Riedl, 2010; Deloitte, 2007) and are therefore required to disclose information with regard to 
the realized and estimated (ex-ante long term) pay received by CEOs. In addition, publicly 
listed firms in these countries select CEOs with heterogenous career backgrounds and 
experiences – providing an appropriate setting for investigating the link between CEO career 
generalism and initial compensation. 
Our sample firms were selected by first ranking all stock-listed firms by market 
capitalization in each of the four target countries and subsequently identifying the 100 largest 
firms in each country. Next, we excluded firms that fell within the European Commission’s 
(2016) definition of small and medium-sized enterprises; were financial investment units with 
a primary industry categorization of 67 (i.e., investment holdings/offices/trusts); became part 
of a new corporate entity following a merger/acquisition or were nationalized during the 
observation period; were non-autonomous subsidiaries of a parent firm; and were family-
controlled (Miller, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2013). These criteria were applied to ensure that our 
sample firms were a heterogeneous yet consistent and comparable set of large publicly held 
organizations. 
Following the application of these criteria, our selected sample was 330 large stock-listed 
European firms. We then identified all CEO appointments between January 1, 2007 and 
December 31, 2013 in these 330 companies. The total number of new CEOs identified over the 
seven-year period was 305. To ensure comparability among CEOs, we excluded interim 
appointments or cases where the new CEO had shared leadership responsibilities with another 
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co-CEO. Information about executives and directors was obtained through manual data 
collection from annual reports, company websites and databases that provide information about 
executive career profiles (e.g., Nexis and Who is Who). Firm- and industry-level data was 
retrieved from Bloomberg and ThomsonONE. The exclusion of missing observations led to a 
final sample of 197 CEO appointments. We ran Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests to observe whether 
the missing observations systematically differ from the final sample. These tests show that the 
distributions of the variables CEO total initial compensation, return on assets (ROA), and CEO 
career length do not significantly differ between the two samples. 
 
Dependent variable 
CEO total initial compensation is measured as the total sum of all forms of remuneration the 
firm provided to the new CEO in the first complete fiscal year of appointment (Bragaw & 
Misangyi, 2017; Falato et al., 2015). Data on CEO compensation (in Euros) was retrieved from 
the Bloomberg Professional database. Per Bloomberg professional, our variable CEO total 
initial compensation includes total fixed salary, bonus, stock options, restricted stock, all other 
long-term incentives, and other miscellaneous pay (e.g., life insurance, pension benefits, tax 
reimbursements) as reported by the companies. To enhance completeness and accuracy, data 
were cross-checked and supplemented from firms’ annual reports. To deal with 
heteroskedasticity and account for the fact that long term pay valuation approaches are likely 
to over- or under-value CEO long term pay (Conyon & Murphy, 2000), we transformed this 
variable to its natural logarithm (Chen, 2015; Falato et al., 2015). 
We focus on new CEO initial compensation as this provides a context which is relatively 
less influenced by the managerial power issues that occur as CEOs accumulate tenure in the 
firm. Over time, CEOs accumulate power in the organization and can thereby exert an 
increasing influence on the level and structure of executive remuneration (for a meta-analysis, 
see: van Essen et al., 2015). Such accumulation of power over the CEO’s tenure may mask the 
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effects of CEO human capital on pay (Chen, 2015; Graffin et al., 2020). According to Chen 
(2015: 1895; 1896), focusing on CEO initial compensation allows scholars to unveil “the 
difficulty of teasing out the effect of organizational entrenchment. [CEO] initial compensation 
negotiation is relatively immune from the entrenchment of CEO power.” Focusing on CEO 
total initial compensation therefore allows us to adequately examine the hypothesized 
relationships in a context where CEO pay is mostly determined by human capital 
considerations, rather than by managerial power (Chen, 2015; Graffin et al., 2020).  
Based on Bloomberg Professional, our study captures the estimated value of restricted 
stock grants at the grant date (i.e., in the first full year of the CEO’s appointment) as reported 
by the companies. This is the approach to valuing restricted stock grants required by the IFRS 
in the IFRS-2 share-based reporting principles with which stock-listed firms in the selected 
countries comply (Armstrong et al., 2010; Deloitte, 2007). Further, the ex-ante value of stock 
option grants is captured by most firms using the Black-Scholes option pricing model – which 
is a principal approach suggested by the IFRS for stock options with an expiration date (i.e., 
European options) (Conyon, Peck, & Sadler, 2001). It is important to note that considering the 
ex-ante value of stock options and resrticted stock offered to the new CEO in the first complete 
fiscal year of appointment as reported by the companies – rather than the ex-post value of these 
grants – fits our theoretical approach. This is because the firm will value the CEO’s human 
capital and offer respective initial pay by considering the ex-ante (rather than the unknown ex-
post) value of equity-based pay at the time of the offer (Chen, 2015). 
 
Independent variable 
To measure the level of CEO generalism versus specialization we used Blau’s (1977) 
formula: 1− ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2, where p is the proportion of a CEO’s career (in years) spent in a firm or 
industry 𝑖 (Ferguson & Hasan, 2013). According to Ferguson and Hasan (2013), Blau’s index 
is suitable for measuring the level of generalism versus specialization in an individual’s career 
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background, as it captures both the breadth of knowledge an individual has acquired from 
different firms and industries as well as the relative proportion of career time spent in each firm 
and industry. To obtain the overall CEO generalist experience, we first calculated the Blau 
index for each component separately (i.e., firm and industry experience), and then summed the 
two components to create a composite variable. High scores indicate high career generalism, 
while low scores indicate high career specialization (Ferguson & Hasan, 2013). To test whether 
the two components (i.e., firm and industry experience) load on the same factor, we conducted 
factor analysis in Stata 15.1. Results show that the two components load onto the same factor 
with an alpha coefficient of 0.87 and an eigenvalue of 1.37 – indicating that aggregation of the 
two components is appropriate.   
To ensure accuracy in the coding of CEOs’ career experience, we adopted the following 
procedure. First, we searched annual reports and corporate websites to identify information 
about the CEOs’ career histories (beginning at the start of the CEO’s career and ending at the 
year of appointment as CEO in the focal organization). If complete information was not 
available, we searched other secondary sources that provide CEO biographical and career 
information (e.g., Nexis and Who is who). In our analysis, we used only observations with 
complete information on CEO career history. 
 
Moderator and control variables 
Firm diversification was calculated using the entropy measure of diversification in the 
year of the CEO’s appointment, expressed as ∑ 𝑃𝑖 ln (
1
𝑃𝑖
)𝑁𝑖=1 , where 𝑃 is the share of the firm’s 
sales in an 𝑖 industry segment (Geletkanycz, Boyd, & Finkelstein, 2001). Higher scores indicate 
higher firm diversification. Further, to measure prior firm performance decline we took the 
firm’s ROA two years before the new CEO’s appointment (t-2) and subtracted the firm’s ROA 
one year before the new CEO’s appointment year (t-1) (Tuggle, Sirmon, & Reutzel, 2010). 
Higher scores indicate a greater decline in ROA prior to succession. Following Dess and Beard 
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(1984), industry complexity was measured using the Gibbs-Martin (1962) industry 
concentration ratio, calculated as 1 − [∑ 𝑥2 (∑ 𝑥)2⁄ ], where 𝑥 is the total market share of all 
companies from the same industry within the sample. Higher scores indicate higher industry 
complexity. 
We employed several control variables to account for potential confounding factors. First, 
MBA degrees are widely considered as general business education programs and have thus 
been linked to generalist human capital and initial executive pay (Datta & Iskandar-Datta, 
2014). We thus controlled for CEO MBA, measured as a dichotomous variable taking the value 
of 1 for CEOs with an MBA degree and 0 otherwise. To account for the overall stock of a 
CEO’s career experience, we controlled for CEO career length (in years) from the CEO’s career 
start to the year of appointment as CEO in the focal organization. Further, individuals who have 
been CEOs of other firms prior to their appointment at the focal organization are likely to 
receive higher initial pay (Bragaw & Misangyi, 2017; Custodio et al., 2013). Thus, we 
controlled for prior CEO experience. This variable takes the value of 1 if the individual held 
the role of CEO at another stock-listed firm prior to appointment in the focal organization, and 
0 otherwise.  
Further, we controlled for CEO functional experience variety. This variable was 
calculated using Blau’s (1977) formula, expressed as 1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2, where p is the relative 
proportion of a CEO’s career time spent in functional category 𝑖. Similar to prior research, we 
coded a CEO’s functional experience using the following ten categories: 
manufacturing&engineering, production, accounting&finance, R&D, marketing&sales, 
general managemen&administration, legal affairs, human resources, policy/strategy/corporate 
development, and other (Michel & Hambrick, 1992). In addition, studies have shown that prior 
managerial experience often relate to higher CEO initial compensation (Bragaw & Misangyi, 
2017). This is based on the notion that experience from general management posts is associated 
with skilled leadership, which is an important experience-related attribute that may lead to 
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higher CEO initial compensation (Fulmer, 2009). To account for this, we controlled for the 
proportion of career time the CEO had spent in general management posts – defined as positions 
with administration and general management responsibilities. To calculate the career in general 
management, we divided the total number of years the CEO had spent in general 
management/administration functional roles by overall CEO career length. 
Moreover, CEOs who have worked for a string of highly reputable companies would 
exhibit stronger legitimacy in the executive labor market and would therefore naturally 
command higher initial compensation (Bidwell, Won, Barbulascu, & Mollick, 2015). 
Following prior studies (Boivie, Graffin, & Gentry, 2016), we thus controlled for the number 
of companies in which a CEO had worked over his or her career that were included in the 
Fortune World’s Most Admired companies. The Fortune World’s Most Admired Companies 
index evaluates company reputation based on nine different criteria: innovation, people 
management, use of corporate assets, social responsibility, quality management, financial 
soundness, long-term investment value, quality of products/services and global competitiveness 
– and ranks the top companies in each industry worldwide together with contenders (Boivie et 
al., 2016). Similar approaches for evaluating CEOs’ career legitimacy have been applied by 
scholars in the field of CEO human capital and compensation (Bidwell et al., 2015). Controlling 
for this aspect allows us to consider potential confounding effects that may derive from CEO 
legitimacy in prior career experience. 
Following Falato et al. (2015), we also controlled for CEO fast-track career to account 
for CEOs with exceptional career progression. According to Falato et al. (2015: 2850), a fast 
track career is a proxy for “the quality of the CEOs’ career track records based on how fast they 
cleared the bar for their first CEO jobs. The intuition for why this variable is a signal of skills 
is based on the competitive sorting theories of firm hierarchy where […] more talented 
executives will spend less time on the corporate ladder and sooner clear the CEO hurdle”. In 
their study, Falato et al. (2015) underscore that the notion of a CEO fast track career may be 
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biased by the fact that CEOs who started their career earlier in time are likely to have been less 
mobile compared to those who started their career more recently. To overcome this issue, they 
clustered CEOs based on their age into three cohorts (centiles) and compared them with the 
median ‘time to CEO’ within their respective cohort. Consistent with Falato et al. (2015), we 
measured time to CEO by first defining three centiles of new CEO career length within our 
sample, and then subtracting the time (in years) an individual took to become CEO for the first 
time in his or her career from the median time to CEO within his or her respective career length 
cohort. This allowed us to evaluate the impact of CEO fast-track careers by comparing CEOs 
who started their career at around the same point in time. 
We controlled for outside CEO origin, coded as 1 if the new CEO had two or less years 
of firm tenure in the year of appointment, and 0 if the CEO had firm tenure of more than two 
years (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). To account for whether the CEO had acquired experience 
from within the firm’s focal industry, we controlled for CEO industry specific experience. This 
variable was coded as 1 for CEOs who had one or more years of prior working experience in 
the focal firm’s industry, and 0 otherwise (Chung & Luo, 2013). To capture any gender-related 
impact on CEO initial compensation, we controlled for CEO gender – a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 for female CEOs and 0 otherwise.  
As initial pay might be influenced by the attributes of the prior CEO, we controlled for 
prior CEO tenure, reason for departure (i.e., retirement), and predecessor succession origin. 
First, predecessor tenure was calculated as the number of years the predecessor served as CEO 
in the focal firm. Previous research has suggested that long-tenured CEOs have greater power 
in the firm (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). Thus, a long-tenured departing predecessor might 
influence the new CEO’s initial compensation. Second, scholars have shown that predecessor 
CEOs who leave the firm due to ordinary retirement are likely to have a key influence on the 
succession process (Shen & Cannella, 2002), and on the new CEO’s initial compensation 
(Lorsch & Maciver, 1989). Similar to prior studies, predecessor retirement was coded as 1 if 
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the predecessor CEO was older than 65 in the year of the new CEO’s appointment and 0 
otherwise (Shen & Cannella, 2002). Third, we controlled for predecessor hiring mode – given 
that predecessors who were hired from outside the firm are likely to have a higher starting pay 
compared to those appointed from the organization’s internal ranks (Harris & Helfat, 1997). 
This variable was coded as 1 if the predecessor CEO was hired from outside the firm (i.e. had 
a firm tenure of two or less years when they were hired as CEOs in the focal firm (Hambrick & 
Fukutomi, 1991; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004)) and 0 otherwise.   
To account for the degree of firm-specific experience of other top management team 
(TMT) members, we controlled for average TMT firm tenure, calculated as the average number 
of years top managers (excluding the CEO) had worked in the focal organization at the time of 
the new CEO’s appointment. Further, we controlled for CEO duality, measured as a 
dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the new CEO was also appointed as board chair 
and 0 otherwise (Chen, 2015). Corporate governance scholars have argued that vigilant boards 
influence executive pay (Zorn, Shropshire, Martin, Combs, & Ketchen, 2017). Thus, we 
controlled for board independence, measured as the proportion of outside (non-employee) 
directors.  
Research shows that firm size reflects the job demands facing executives, and thus may 
act as a determinant of CEO compensation (Peng, Sun, & Markoczy, 2015). Hence, we control 
for firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of annual sales. To account for a company’s 
international presence, we also controlled for the firm’s degree of internationalization (DOI) – 
measured as the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (Tallman & Li, 1996). Industry munificence 
was calculated as the regression coefficient of time measured in years on the annual sales 
average in a firm’s primary industry, divided by the overall mean sales of the whole study 
period. Industry dynamism was measured as the dispersion of the regression line obtained in 
the estimation of munificence (Dess & Beard, 1984). Finally, we controlled for country-level 
CEO discretion to account for cross-country differences in CEO managerial discretion, 
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measured using Crossland and Hambrick’s (2011) discretion scores for each of the four 
countries. To account for macro-economic fluctuation effects, we included year dummies in all 
models. 
 
Analytical Strategy 
Our study is based on data nested at three levels: CEOs within firms in years (Level 1), 
firms within industries (Level 2), and variations across industries (Level 3). We therefore 
employed a three-level hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) analytical approach with robust 
standard errors (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Sauerwald, van 
Oosterhoot, van Essen, & Peng, 2018). To facilitate interpretation of results, all variables 
excluding dichotomous and those with a meaningful zero were centered at the grand mean 
(Dawson, 2014; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008).  
The use of an HLM technique allows us to account for systematic variation among 
observations (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), given that, for example, firms in the same industry 
are more likely to have common hiring patterns and CEO selection preferences compared to 
firms in different industries (Datta et al., 2002). In addition, the use of an HLM technique 
enables us to observe the total variance in CEO initial pay explained by individual-, 
organizational- and industry-level factors, and thereby allows to adequately capture the 
multilevel nature of CEO initial compensation (Graffin et al., 2020; van Essen et al, 2012).  
As CEO initial pay may be affected by CEO turnover and selection factors, we applied a 
Heckman two-stage approach to deal with potential endogenous bias and sample selection 
(Heckman, 1979). In the first step, the Heckman approach relies on a Probit model to predict 
the likelihood of CEO turnover in the original target population of companies (i.e., including 
those companies that did not change their CEOs during the study period). Consistent with prior 
research, we employed the frequency (i.e., percentage) of CEO turnover in each firm’s first-
digit SIC industry as an instrument. To ensure that our instrumental variable was independently 
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determined, we excluded the focal company from the industry-average CEO turnover measure 
(Zorn et al., 2017). Based on the Heckman’s Probit model (Table I in Online Supplement), we 
calculated the inverse Mills ratio and used it as a control variable in our main analysis. This 
way, our analysis accounts for potential unobserved factors associated with CEO replacement 
that may concurrently impact new CEO selection and initial compensation (Falato et al., 2015). 
 
RESULTS 
To test whether a multilevel analytical approach is appropriate based on the structure of 
our data, we first run the null HLM model – where only the dependent and predictor variables 
are included. The overall null HLM model is significant (p-value =.000), implying that a three 
level HLM technique is appropriate (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). Further, we examined 
the decomposition of variance in the null HLM model. Results show that the largest proportion 
of variance in CEO total initial compensation is explained at the firm-level (54 percent). With 
another large proportion explained at the individual level (35 percent). Finally, a remaining 
smaller proportion of variance is explained at the industry level. This demonstrates that CEO 
initial compensation is explained by factors nested at different layers of context – with the firm-
level and the individual-level playing the most central role (Table II in online supplement). 
**************************************** 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
**************************************** 
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations and correlations among variables, while 
Table 2 provides results of the main HLM analysis with robust standard errors (Rabe-Hesketh 
& Skrondal, 2008). To check for multicollinearity, we performed variance inflation factor (VIF) 
tests after OLS regression (Cannella et al., 2008). With an average VIF of 1.73 in Model 1 of 
Table 2, these tests indicate that our results are unlikely to be affected by multicollinearity. 
Model 1 in Table 2 tests for a linear (i.e., non-quadratic) relationship, while Models 2 to 5 add 
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the squared term and each interaction effect separately. Finally, Model 6 includes all main and 
interaction effects. As Model 1 in Table 2 shows, the linear relationship between CEO generalist 
experience and CEO total initial compensation is not significant (𝑏 = 0.04; s.e. = 0.11; p-value 
=.739). Hypothesis 1 predicts an inverted U-shape relationship between CEO generalist 
experience and CEO total initial compensation. Results support this hypothesis (𝑏 = -0.48; s.e. 
= 0.21; p-value =.020 in Model 2 and b = -0.97; s.e.= 0.38; p-value=.011 in Model 6 of Table 
2). As further shown in Figure 1, the acquisition of broad-general career experience increases 
CEO initial pay up to a threshold after which CEO value and initial compensation gradually 
declines. 
To practically interpret this finding, we estimated the effect size at one standard deviation 
above and below the mean of our predictor variable (Dawson, 2014). Results show that CEO 
generalism at one standard deviation above the mean amounts to a reduction in CEO total initial 
compensation of 10.2%; while at one standard deviation below the mean CEO total initial 
compensation is reduced by 30.1%. Following the recommendations of Lind and Mehlum, 
(2010) and Haans, Pieters, and He (2016) we performed curvilinearity tests after an OLS 
regression with robust standard errors and all variables uncentered to confirm the existence of 
the inverted U-shape relationship. First, we examined whether the lower and the upper slopes 
of the observed inverted curvilinear relationship were significant (Haans et al., 2016). Results 
show that both the lower bound (p-value = .009) and the upper bound (p-value = .004) of the 
observed relationship are significant – confirming the presence of an inverted U-shape curve. 
To ensure the existence of an inverted U-shape relationship, we conducted the following 
tests (see Table III of the online supplement). First, we performed the Sasabuchi (1980) 
curvilinearity test – as recommended by Lind and Mehlum (2010). This test also supports the 
overall presence of an inverted curvilinear relationship (p-value =.009). Further, using Fieller’s 
standard errors, we checked whether the curve’s estimated turning point (i.e., extreme point) is 
within the range of our independent variable and its Fieller intervals (Haans et al., 2016). In our 
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case, the curve’s estimated turning point in the OLS regression analysis (0.71) is both within 
the range of CEO career generalism (0 to 1.63) and its Fieller intervals (0.39; 0.94). This 
indicates that the observed curvilinear effect is appropriately captured. Finally, to check 
whether there is a cubic (S-shaped) rather than a quadratic relationship, we ran our HLM 
analysis by adding a cubic term of CEO generalist experience in Model 2. Results do not 
provide support for a cubic relationship (𝑏 = -0.36; s.e.= 0.51; p-value = .475). 
Hypothesis 2 posits that the downward slope of the inverted U-shape relationship between 
CEO generalist experience and initial compensation will flatten (become less pronounced) 
under conditions of high firm diversification. Results do not provide support for this hypothesis. 
Our findings show that the hypothesized effect is non-supported (𝑏 = 0.54; s.e.= 0.34; p-value 
= .114 in Model 3, and 𝑏 = 0.55; s.e.= 0.36; p-value = .124 in Model 6).  
Hypothesis 3 suggests that the downward slope of the inverted U-shape relationship 
becomes less pronounced under conditions of declining prior firm performance. In contrast to 
our initial expectations, results show that CEOs with relatively moderate levels of generalist 
experience receive even higher initial compensation compared to those at the extremes when 
they are appointed by firms with performance decline in preceding years (i.e., the inverted U-
shape relationship becomes more pronounced under such conditions) (b= -0.07; s.e.= 0.02; p-
value =.001 in Model 4; and b= -0.06; s.e.= 0.02; p-value =.013 in Model 6). While this finding 
seems counterintuitive and is in contrast to hypothesis 3, it has a logical appeal. It is in line with 
prior research on organizational adaptation (Haveman, 1992; Sastry, 1997), which suggests 
that, under conditions of declining firm performance, firms seek to both (a) strengthen 
established routines and specialized competencies, and (b) explore radically new competencies. 
Given that CEOs with moderate levels of generalism possess a relative balance of broad-general 
and narrow-specialized experience compared to extensive generalists or extensive specialists, 
they may be considered as better equipped to respond to the simultaneous exploration and 
exploitation needs facing firms with declining performance (Boh, Evaristo, & Ouderkirk, 
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2014). Thus, their blend of broad and specialized human capital is compensated higher at the 
time of selection under such conditions (see Figure 2).  
Indeed, our effect size estimates show that under conditions of high prior firm 
performance decline, CEO generalist experience at one standard deviation above the mean 
triggers a reduction in CEO total initial compensation of 17.9%, whereas one standard deviation 
below the mean shows a reduction in CEO total initial compensation of 39.3%. Under 
conditions of low prior firm performance decline, CEO generalism at one standard deviation 
above the mean shows a reduction in CEO total initial compensation of only 2.9%, and at one 
standard deviation below the mean the reduction in CEO total initial pay is 21.2%.  
Finally, Hypothesis 4 posits that under conditions of industry complexity, the downward 
slope of the inverted U-shape relationship flattens (i.e. becomes less pronounced). Our results 
substantiate this hypothesis (𝑏 = 3.38; s.e.= 1.34; p-value =.012 in Model 5, and b=3.19; s.e. 
= 1.46; p-value =.029 in Model 6). As Figure 3 shows, under conditions of high industry 
complexity, the downward slope of the inverted U-shape relationship becomes less pronounced 
(i.e., flattens). The effect size estimates show that under conditions of high industry complexity, 
CEO generalism at one standard deviation above the mean triggers a slight increase in CEO 
initial compensation of 2.1%. Under conditions of low industry complexity CEO generalism at 
one standard deviation above the mean results in a decrease in CEO initial pay of 21.0%. 
Overall, these results show that under conditions of high industry complexity, there is no 
negative impact of high career generalism on CEO total initial pay – substantiating the 
hypothesis that the inverted U-shape relationship flattens under such conditions. 
 
**************************************** 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
**************************************** 
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**************************************** 
INSERT FIGURES 1 TO 3 ABOUT HERE 
**************************************** 
Robustness Tests 
 We also employed the Durbin and Wu-Hausman approaches to ensure that our results 
are not affected by endogeneity beyond sample selection. In accordance with prior studies, we 
employed the one-digit SIC industry average of CEO generalism as an instrument (excluding 
the focal firm) (Zorn et al., 2017). We conducted the Basmann test to check for the 
appropriateness of the instrument. This test confirmed the suitability of the selected instrument 
(chi2=2.64; p=.104). Results of the Durbin (p=0.853) and Wu-Hausman (p=0.866) tests 
provided no evidence of endogeneity. 
We also conducted the following supplementary analyses to check the sensitivity of our 
findings to alternative operationalizations of key variables. First, we performed additional 
analyses with CEO initial cash compensation (the sum of fixed salary and bonus), and CEO 
initial long term pay as dependent variables. We did this to observe whether both initial cash 
and initial non-cash compensation demonstrate an inverted U-shape pattern. Following prior 
research, initial long-term pay was transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sign function, 
instead of natural logarithm, given that some CEO contracts do not include a long term pay 
component (Kolev, Wiseman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2017). The supplementary analyses show that 
with both components of CEO total initial pay our results follow similar patterns. The observed 
effects for CEO initial cash pay, however, are more robust than the observed effects for the 
long-term initial CEO pay component. This is in line with the arguments of prior research that 
“because experience is relatively permanent, stable, and cumulative, it is most likely to 
influence pay via the permanent, stable, and cumulative dimension of pay” (i.e., cash 
compensation) (Fulmer, 2009: 668). Results of these analyses are available on Table IV of the 
online supplement. 
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 Second, studies have shown that boards and compensation committees often set CEO 
pay by comparing the initial compensation offered to new CEOs in other industry peer firms 
(Seo, Gemache, Devers, & Carpenter, 2015; Wowak, Hambrick, & Henderson, 2011). To 
account for this, we followed the approach suggested by Shin (2016) and re-ran our analyses 
by adjusting CEO total initial compensation to the average CEO total initial pay at other sample 
firms in the same one-digit SIC industry as the focal organization. This allows us to consider 
whether new CEOs with different career backgrounds are paid more, or less, in their first full 
year of appointment compared to the mean of total initial CEO pay in the same industry – i.e. 
beyond the two-digit industry nesting we use in the HLM analysis. Results of these analyses do 
not substantially differ from those reported in Table 2 and are available in Table V of the online 
supplement. Third, our study uses a multi-country sample where country-level institutional 
factors may affect CEO total initial compensation (van Essen et al., 2012). While our main 
analysis accounts for this by controlling for cross-national differences in CEO discretion, we 
re-estimated our empirical models with CEO total initial compensation adjusted to the country-
average of CEO initial pay. The results do not substantially differ from our main analysis (Table 
2) and are available in Table VI of the online supplement.  
 
DISCUSSION 
This study examined the link between CEO generalist career experience and CEO initial 
compensation. We have conceptualized and empirically tested a contingency framework that 
reconciles two opposing theoretical streams, namely: (a) the generalism view which contends 
that managers and CEOs with broad-general career backgrounds are more valued by the market 
for executive labor and thus receive higher initial pay; and (b) the specialization view which 
underscores the importance of specialized human capital, and its career-related and economic 
advantages. By bringing together these seemingly opposing perspectives, our research 
considers both the benefits and costs of accumulating varied career experience – and suggests 
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that the relationship between CEO career generalism and CEO initial compensation follows an 
inverted U-shape form. Our results support this prediction (Figure 1). They also reveal that the 
observed inverted U-shape relationship varies with the firm’s internal and external context 
(Figures 2 and 3). Overall, our study shows that penalties in the economic value of executive 
human capital (i.e., initial compensation) at the time of CEO selection occur not only for 
executives who extensively specialize throughout their careers and thus lack generalist skills 
(Custodio et al., 2013; Frydman, 2019; Murphy & Zabojnik, 2004), but also for those who 
extensively engage in career mobility across firm and industry contexts. 
Our study contributes to the literature of strategic leadership and CEO initial 
compensation in multiple ways. First, it highlights and resolves a longstanding theoretical 
debate over whether CEOs with generalist versus specialist human capital receive higher initial 
pay. Our theory and results stress that the notions of generalism and specialization should be 
considered together, as CEOs with balanced careers (i.e., those who maintain a relative balance 
between generalism and specialization) are those who are most valued by the market for 
executive labor and thus receive higher initial compensation. Broadly speaking, our results have 
implications for the ‘resource-based’ perspective of CEO human capital (Campbell, Coff, & 
Kryscynski, 2012; Carpenter et al., 2001; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Mackey, Molloy, & Morris, 
2014), as well as for the emerging literature on CEO initial pay (Bragaw & Misangyi, 2017; 
Chen, 2015; Graffin et al., 2020). Prior studies have regarded broad-general managerial skills 
as a relatively scarce human capital resource (Mackey et al., 2014), arguing that CEOs with 
broad-general experience from various firms and industries are those who receive higher initial 
remuneration returns as a result of their prior career investments (Custodio et al., 2013). Yet, 
our results show that CEOs at moderate levels of career generalism are perceived as more 
valuable in the executive labor market (see Figure 1). Neither the frequent job-hoppers who 
have been highly mobile across firm and industry environments throughout their professional 
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career, nor those executives who have spent their entire career in a single firm and industry are 
likely to extract the highest value at the time of their appointment.  
Indeed, our study extends the arguments of Murphy and Zabojnik (2004: 193), Frydman 
(2019) and Custodio et al. (2013), who stress that generalist experience is “priced” while 
specialist experience is “unpriced” in the modern CEO labor market. We demonstrate that 
career investments in generalism and specialization are most ‘priced’ when they are 
proportional and balanced out over an individual’s career development. Acknowledging the 
value of balancing generalism and specialization in executive careers is important from both a 
theoretical and a practical point of view – as it allows to appreciate not only how CEO initial 
pay reflects the prior career investments of individual executives (Devers et al., 2007; Falato et 
al., 2015), but also to probe the frequently invoked assumption that extensive career mobility 
is the ‘path to prosperity’ for newly appointed CEOs. If firms are to attract and develop 
executives with valuable human capital (Custodio et al., 2013; Geletkanycz et al. 2001), and as 
compensation consultants strive to provide accurate predictions about the economic value of 
CEOs’ career credentials (Conyon, Hass, Peck, Sadler, & Zhang, 2019), the notions of 
generalism and specialization should be considered in conjunction. 
Second, our study contributes to our understanding of how the relationship between CEO 
career background and initial compensation varies with contingencies. In their conceptual 
study, Hambrick et al. (2005) distinguished between two different sources of ‘context-induced’ 
job demands facing CEOs – i.e., complexity challenges and performance challenges. They 
claimed that these two sources of job demands are likely to pose different challenges for CEOs 
and are thereby expected to have different effects on CEO-level outcomes (including initial 
compensation). In a recent study, Chen (2015) also argued that CEO initial pay is influenced 
by the job demands that newly hired CEOs are likely to face after taking charge. Contributing 
to this nascent area, our study shows that different types of context-induced executive job 
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demands have differential effects on the relationship between CEO career background and 
initial compensation. 
Specifically, in highly complex industries, the negative effects of extensive levels of CEO 
career generalism on initial compensation tend to become less pronounced – i.e. the downward 
slope of the inverted U-shape relationship flattens (see Figure 3). In contrast to our ex-ante 
expectations, however, our analysis does not provide significant support for a moderating effect 
of firm diversification – which has been regarded by prior studies as another source of firm-
level complexity influencing CEO pay (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). 
Moreover, building on the notion that poorly performing firms tend to value and 
compensate new CEOs with generalist experience more highly (Chen, 2015; Custodio et al., 
2019), we hypothesized that the downward slope of the inverted U-shape relationship will 
flatten in situations of prior performance decline. In contrast to our initial expectations, our 
results show that, under such conditions, CEOs at moderate levels of the generalist experience 
continuum realize even higher initial pay relative to extensive generalists and extensive 
specialists (see Figure 3). The differences in our findings regarding the moderating effects of 
prior performance vis-à-vis industry complexity may be attributed to the different nature of 
executive job demands they pose to CEOs (Hambrick et al., 2005).  
On the one hand, declining firm performance implies a need to hire CEOs who are likely 
to implement changes that will improve organizational performance (Chen, 2015). Research 
has shown that under conditions of declining prior performance, firms need to focus on 
strengthening their existing capabilities and advantages, as well as discovering new paths and 
competencies (Haveman, 1992; Sastry, 1997). In such conditions, a CEO with moderate levels 
of generalist experience may be perceived as particularly valuable in the firm’s quest to both 
strengthen existing competencies and explore new ground (Chen, 2015; Lugeanu & Zajac, 
2019). In addition, following a period of declining performance, firms face greater difficulties 
in recruiting and appointing executives with valuable human capital (Philips & Gully, 2015). 
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Therefore, they may offer a relatively higher pay premium to attract and appoint CEOs with 
valuable skills and experience (Chen, 2015). As CEOs at moderate levels of the generalist 
experience continuum are generally more valued in the market for executive labor (see Figure 
1), they are likely to request and receive higher initial pay to take on the leadership of poorly 
performing firms (see Figure 2). Conversely, industry complexity refers to the demands that 
derive from the complexity facing the firm in its environment (Hambrick et al., 2005). Under 
these conditions, the possession of highly diverse career experience is more likely to be valued 
by the firm, as it enhances the firm’s information processing capacity and external connections 
– thereby triggering a relatively lower ‘penalty’ in initial compensation for CEOs with high 
levels of generalist experience (Figure 3).  
Finally, another contribution of our study rests on the use of a multilevel theoretical and 
analytical approach in examining the determinants of CEO initial compensation. Scholars have 
recently recognized that the construct of CEO initial compensation is multilevel (Graffin et al., 
2020) – as it comprises micro (individual), meso (organizational), and macro (industry) level 
drivers. At each of these levels, different mechanisms affect CEO initial compensation. 
Whereas scholars have separately investigated the individual (Harris & Helfat, 1997), 
organizational (Chen, 2015), and industry (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998) determinants of CEO 
pay, the conjoint impact of multilevel factors has rarely been explored (for exemptions see: 
Graffin et al., 2020; van Essen et al., 2012). Contributing to this emerging area, our study 
underscores the complex and multilevel nature of the relationship between CEO career 
experience and initial compensation.     
 
Practical Implications, Limitations and Future Research 
Our study has important practical implications. Practitioner-oriented articles advocate 
that in today’s increasingly uncertain environment, “breadth of perspective trumps depth of 
knowledge” (Mansharamani, 2012:1), and that extensive “breadth, not depth, will be the key to 
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successful 21st century management” (Korn Ferry, 2011:11). However, our results challenge 
the notion that CEOs “are better off being jacks-of-all-trades” (Torres, 2016: 2). Instead, our 
study demonstrates that CEOs with high levels of career generalism receive lower pay in their 
first year in office compared to those at relatively moderate levels. In making strategic career 
investments, executives should hence be aware of the downsides of excessive job-hopping and 
career mobility. Individuals who seek to realize a higher economic value – as a result of their 
career investments – should not only focus on acquiring a variety of knowledge from different 
settings, but also to retain and signal a sufficient level of career specialization and expertise. In 
this regard, our work provides a cautionary note stressing that the notions of generalism and 
specialization should be considered in conjunction in order to make optimal decisions for 
executive career development. 
 Our study is subject to some limitations which highlight avenues for future research. 
First, it inherently adopts a rent creation logic (Castanias & Helfat, 1991), which suggests that 
executives invest in career experiences, and thus, markets reward (or penalize) them for these 
investments (Peng et al., 2015). We therefore attribute a degree of rationality to firms and CEO 
candidates when making compensation and career decisions. Yet, studies suggest that boards 
and remuneration committees are influenced by several behavioral factors beyond an 
individual’s human capital (Devers et al., 2007). Future research could examine whether 
behavioral factors, or CEO-board relational features, affect the observed inverted U-shape 
relationship (Combs & Skill, 2003). For example, future research on the CEO-board, or 
successor-predecessor interface can help to advance our understanding of the relationship 
between new CEO career background and initial compensation (Georgakakis, Heyden, 
Oehmichen, & Ekanayake, in press). 
Second, the use of publicly available archival data does not allow access to the actual 
pool of candidates that the firm considered when making a CEO selection decision. Arguably, 
a CEO with moderate levels of generalist career experience may also exhibit an overall higher 
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likelihood of appointment to CEO positions across firms facing different conditions, and may 
therefore receive a larger number of job offers (Merluzzi & Phillips, 2016). While our study 
provides evidence with regard to the economic value realized by new CEOs with balanced 
experience breadth and depth at the time of selection, future research can delve into the CEO 
recruitment process to examine how different levels of generalist versus specialist experience 
impact the likelihood of an individual’s appointment to the CEO position. Such research can 
integrate elements from the literature on strategic recruiting and strategic staffing (Philips & 
Gully, 2015), further link the notions of CEO selection and initial compensation, and thus 
unfold the processes through which CEO pay decisions are made. 
Relatedly, the use of archival data does not allow us to observe the risk preferences of 
CEOs, as well as the risk considerations of firms, in order to reveal how deeply-held behavioral 
factors may have affected the compensation-negotiation process. In a recent study, Graffin et 
al., (2020) found that a key proxy for CEO values – i.e., political ideology – impacts CEOs’ 
inherent risk preferences regarding the structure of their compensation packages. Future studies 
can build on the approach of Graffin et al. and integrate elements from recent research on CEO 
big-five personality traits (Harrison, Thurgood, Boivie, & Pfarrer, 2019), to examine how risk 
perceptions of the CEO and the board of directors affect CEO initial compensation. This will 
help us to further unveil the role of deep level psychological factors (Hodgkinson & Healey, 
2011; 2018) in determining CEO initial pay arrangements, and thereby bridge the micro-macro 
divide (Eckardt et al., 2018) in executive compensation. 
Finally, our study focuses only on the initial pay received by new CEOs in their first 
complete fiscal year of appointment. As explained, this approach minimizes the managerial-
power effects that become increasingly prominent as CEOs accumulate tenure in the firm 
(Chen, 2015; Graffin et al., 2020). Hence, our results are not necessarily generalizable to CEO 
pay in the years after appointment – when CEOs become established in their leadership 
positions and exert more influence on pay decisions. An interesting avenue for future research 
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would therefore be to consider whether CEOs at different levels of the generalist experience 
continuum are more (or less) likely to accumulate power in the firm over time, and thus realize 
positive revisions (i.e., settling-up) in their pay after appointment (Seo et al., 2017; Wowak et 
al., 2011). Although the post-appointment settling up in CEO compensation is outside the scope 
of this study, we conducted a limited post-hoc analysis to test whether the new CEOs in our 
sample experience positive (or negative) revisions to their initial compensation in the years after 
appointment – and how this is influenced by their level of generalism. To test this, we 
considered whether the initial compensation received by the CEOs in our sample increased (or 
decreased) in their subsequent years of tenure – starting from their third year in office (Wowak 
et al., 2011) and ending either at the time of their exit or in the year 2017 (the final year of our 
studied period). Results did not provide support for an inverted curvilinear relationship between 
CEO generalist career experience and settling up in CEO compensation. Future studies, 
however, should employ samples of both newly appointed and incumbent CEOs to further delve 
into this relationship, and control for a more comprehensive set of variables that are likely to 
impact a CEO’s post-appointment settling up in compensation (e.g., mergers and acquisitions 
pursued by the CEO over his or her years of tenure, or strategic changes that affected CEO job 
demands and subsequent compensation).  
In sum, our study demonstrates that high levels of CEO generalist career experience do 
not necessarily imply higher CEO initial pay returns. This can provide a useful foundation for 
future studies on the effects of career background on the initial compensation of CEOs. In light 
of the changing nature of executive careers (Greve, Biemann, & Ruigrok, 2015), understanding 
the effects of generalist experience on CEO initial pay is expected to be an area of increasing 
importance – for both scholars and practitioners – in the years to come. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (continued next page) 
Variables x̄ SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. CEO total init. 
compensationa  
14.48 0.87 ~              
2. Ind. complexity 0.87 0.11 0.13 ~             
3.  Ind. munificence 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.41 ~            
4. Ind. dynamism 0.08 0.04 -0.02 -0.20 -0.53 ~           
5. CEO career length 26.50 6.08 0.19 -0.13 0.01 0.14 ~          
6. Board independence 0.86 0.14 -0.21 0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.08 ~         
7. TMT firm tenure 12.09 7.04 0.19 -0.17 0.16 -0.00 0.08 -0.12 ~        
8. Firm size (sales)a 8.44 1.79 0.61 -0.02 -0.20 0.11 0.17 -0.11 0.33 ~       
9. Degree of internati. 0.54 0.32 0.24 -0.11 0.42 -0.08 0.09 0.08 0.21 0.15 ~      
10. Firm diversificat. 0.96 0.50 0.20 0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.18 0.21 0.35 0.10 ~     
11. Country CEO disc.  5.05 0.67 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 0.06 0.22 -0.51 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 ~    
12. Prior perf. decl. 0.58 7.43 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.14 0.08 0.08 -0.03 -0.11 0.15 -0.05 0.03 ~   
13. CEO MBA 0.19 0.40 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.22 0.02 ~  
14. CEO duality 0.04 0.20 -0.03 -0.00 -0.08 0.05 0.28 -0.07 -0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.10 ~ 
15. Fast-track career -0.34 3.89 0.12 -0.04 -0.08 0.10 0.43 -0.01 -0.01 0.12 -0.02 -0.01 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.05 
16. CEO ind. spec.exp. 0.86 0.35 0.11 0.09 -0.11 0.08 0.05 -0.09 0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 
17. CEO funct.exp var. 0.52 0.23 -0.08 0.16 -0.14 -0.05 -0.11 0.13 -0.05 -0.08 -0.11 -0.04 -0.11 -0.04 0.11 -0.09 
18. Prior CEO exp. 0.13 0.33 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.09 -0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.15 
19. Career gen. manag. 0.17 0.20 -0.12 -0.06 0.06 -0.10 -0.01 0.00 -0.15 -0.15 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 -0.07 0.14 
20. Outside CEO orig. 0.44 0.50 -0.14 0.04 0.08 -0.13 -0.05 0.02 -0.25 -0.25 -0.16 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.14 0.02 
21. CEO gender 0.02 0.14 0.00 -0.08 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.11 -0.17 0.11 -0.03 
22. Pred. retirement 0.13 0.33 -0.07 0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.10 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.10 -0.14 -0.20 -0.11 -0.08 
23. Pred. tenure 7.87 5.05 -0.10 -0.03 0.09 -0.12 -0.12 0.01 0.20 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.12 
24. Pred. hiring mode 0.38 0.49 -0.10 0.17 -0.01 -0.10 -0.16 0.05 -0.23 -0.26 -0.06 -0.11 -0.12 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 
25. Legitim. in prior 
career exp 
0.92 0.94 0.30 0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.10 0.03 0.29 0.06 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.04 
26.CEO generalist 
exp. 
0.78 0.49 -0.06 0.12 0.03 -0.12 -0.00 -0.00 -0.25 -0.18 -0.07 0.06 -0.04 -0.11 -0.04 0.01 
27.CEO generalist 
exp.2 
0.84 0.71 -0.09 0.10 0.07 -0.14 0.02 -0.02 -0.22 -0.19 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.13 -0.03 0.03 
N=197; Correlations coefficients at p<0.05 are in bold italics; a natural logarithm 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (continued) 
Variables 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
15. Fast- track career ~             
16.  CEO ind. spec.exp. 0.00 ~            
17. CEO funct. exp var. -0.13 0.09 ~           
18. Prior CEO exp. -0.45 -0.02 0.18 ~          
19. Career gen manag. -0.12 -0.14 0.19 0.31 ~         
20. Outside CEO orig. -0.08 -0.34 0.21 0.21 0.25 ~        
21. CEO gender 0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 ~         
22. Pred. retirement -0.08 0.11 0.09 0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 ~       
23. Pred. tenure -0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.16 0.05 0.26 ~     
24. Pred. hiring mode -0.14 0.02 0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.17 -0.11 0.08 -0.00 ~    
25. Legitim. in prior 
career exp 
-0.01 -0.00 0.05 0.13 -0.09 0.16 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 ~ 
  
26.CEO generalist exp. -0.09 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.19 -0.00 -0.07 -0.04 0.19 0.20 ~  
27.CEO generalist exp.2 -0.09 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.16 0.16 -0.00 -0.06 -0.08 0.15    0.18     0.96       ~  
N=197; Correlations at p<0.05 are in bold italics; a natural logarithm 
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TABLE 2 
HLM Analysis with CEO Total Compensation as Dependent Variablea 
 
 
 
Coef Std.Err P-value Coef Std.Err P-value Coef Std.Err P-value Coef Std.Err P-value Coef Std.Err P-value Coef Std.Err P-value
Constant 13.52 0.28 0.000 13.39 0.30 0.000 12.86 0.35 0.000 13.40 0.31 0.000 13.39 0.29 0.000 12.95 0.35 0.000
Inverse Mills ratio 0.19 0.12 0.111 0.20 0.12 0.106 0.23 0.12 0.067 0.19 0.13 0.150 0.21 0.13 0.100 0.23 0.13 0.087
Industry complexity 1.60 0.52 0.002 1.56 0.49 0.002 1.36 0.49 0.006 1.58 0.49 0.001 2.28 0.56 0.000 1.93 0.50 0.000
Industry munificence 3.66 2.29 0.110 3.56 2.22 0.108 3.54 2.25 0.116 4.42 2.27 0.051 3.61 2.22 0.104 4.11 2.37 0.083
Industry dynamism 0.16 1.19 0.893 -0.13 1.18 0.910 -0.17 1.23 0.887 0.17 1.16 0.885 0.00 1.16 0.997 0.11 1.24 0.929
CEO career length 0.01 0.01 0.142 0.01 0.01 0.115 0.01 0.01 0.192 0.01 0.01 0.174 0.01 0.01 0.204 0.01 0.01 0.311
Board independence -1.42 0.41 0.001 -1.41 0.39 0.000 -1.36 0.34 0.000 -1.33 0.39 0.001 -1.42 0.40 0.000 -1.32 0.34 0.000
TMT firm tenure -0.00 0.01 0.950 0.00 0.01 0.851 0.00 0.01 0.694 -0.00 0.01 0.966 0.00 0.01 0.800 0.00 0.01 0.784
Firm size (sales)b 0.29 0.04 0.000 0.28 0.04 0.000 0.28 0.04 0.000 0.29 0.04 0.000 0.28 0.04 0.000 0.28 0.04 0.000
Degree of internationalization 0.45 0.17 0.007 0.48 0.16 0.003 0.47 0.15 0.002 0.52 0.17 0.002 0.46 0.16 0.005 0.49 0.16 0.003
Firm diversification -0.00 0.10 0.987 -0.03 0.09 0.749 0.44 0.15 0.004 -0.05 0.09 0.596 -0.01 0.09 0.897 0.38 0.17 0.021
Country CEO discretion score -0.12 0.08 0.149 -0.11 0.08 0.157 -0.12 0.07 0.098 -0.10 0.07 0.181 -0.09 0.07 0.208 -0.11 0.07 0.130
Prior Performance decline 0.01 0.00 0.066 0.01 0.00 0.082 0.01 0.00 0.050 -0.03 0.01 0.039 0.01 0.00 0.073 -0.02 0.01 0.193
CEO MBA 0.09 0.12 0.447 0.11 0.12 0.334 0.11 0.12 0.338 0.07 0.11 0.532 0.08 0.11 0.436 0.07 0.11 0.548
CEO duality -0.25 0.20 0.224 -0.20 0.20 0.306 -0.17 0.20 0.390 -0.10 0.22 0.640 -0.23 0.20 0.249 -0.12 0.22 0.575
Fast-track career 0.01 0.01 0.493 0.01 0.01 0.614 0.01 0.01 0.474 0.01 0.01 0.502 0.01 0.01 0.488 0.01 0.01 0.315
CEO industry specific experience 0.18 0.11 0.094 0.19 0.10 0.070 0.17 0.11 0.131 0.21 0.11 0.050 0.20 0.11 0.055 0.21 0.12 0.078
CEO functional experience variety 0.03 0.16 0.843 -0.01 0.17 0.973 -0.02 0.17 0.907 -0.07 0.17 0.694 0.02 0.17 0.925 -0.04 0.16 0.791
Prior CEO experience -0.05 0.12 0.696 -0.08 0.11 0.494 -0.05 0.12 0.703 -0.08 0.12 0.474 -0.08 0.12 0.517 -0.05 0.12 0.670
Career general management 0.22 0.19 0.241 0.27 0.18 0.123 0.10 0.20 0.604 0.30 0.18 0.096 0.29 0.18 0.114 0.17 0.20 0.417
Outside CEO origin 0.02 0.09 0.860 0.00 0.09 0.961 -0.00 0.09 0.956 0.00 0.09 0.959 -0.02 0.09 0.823 -0.02 0.08 0.793
CEO gender 0.11 0.21 0.614 0.09 0.19 0.648 0.10 0.20 0.595 -0.11 0.26 0.659 -0.01 0.18 0.938 -0.12 0.22 0.582
Predecessor retirement -0.27 0.13 0.030 -0.23 0.14 0.092 -0.21 0.13 0.112 -0.24 0.14 0.074 -0.25 0.13 0.057 -0.23 0.12 0.059
Predecessor tenure -0.01 0.01 0.636 -0.01 0.01 0.407 -0.01 0.01 0.308 -0.01 0.01 0.499 -0.01 0.01 0.373 -0.01 0.01 0.348
Legitimacy in prior career experience 0.07 0.05 0.175 0.07 0.05 0.117 0.09 0.04 0.050 0.07 0.05 0.140 0.07 0.05 0.147 0.08 0.05 0.095
Predecessor hiring mode 0.07 0.10 0.471 0.04 0.10 0.655 0.05 0.10 0.653 0.01 0.09 0.894 0.05 0.10 0.622 0.02 0.10 0.812
CEO generalist experience 0.04 0.11 0.739 0.72 0.34 0.035 1.93 0.56 0.001 0.68 0.32 0.034 0.65 0.32 0.042 1.77 0.59 0.003
CEO generalist experience^2 -0.48 0.21 0.020 -1.02 0.36 0.005 -0.46 0.20 0.023 -0.44 0.19 0.022 -0.97 0.38 0.011
Level 1-2 Interaction
Firm diversification x CEO generalist experience -1.22 0.49 0.012 -1.15 0.53 0.031
Firm diversification x CEO generalist experience^2 0.54 0.34 0.114 0.55 0.36 0.124
Prior Perf. Decline x CEO generalist experience 0.13 0.03 0.000 0.10 0.04 0.007
Prior Perf. Decline x CEO generalist experience^2 -0.07 0.02 0.001 -0.06 0.02 0.013
Level 1-3 Interaction
Industry complexity x CEO generalist experience -4.63 2.34 0.048 -4.16 2.45 0.090
Industry complexity x CEO generalist experience^2 3.38 1.34 0.012 3.19 1.46 0.029
Deviance: - 2*e(ll) 348.3 343.7 335.6 336.6 340.8 328.4
Notes: Individual level: N=197; Firm level: N= 166; Industry Level: N= 43; a: Year dummies are included but not shown; b: natural logarithm
Model 4 Model 6Model 3Model 1 Model 2 Model 5
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Figure 1: Effect of CEO generalist experience on CEO initial pay 
 
 
Figure 3: Moderating effect of Industry Complexity 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Moderating effect of Prior Performance Decline 
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